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This paper offers a new approach to government’s vendor selection decisions in major public 
procurements. A key challenge is for government purchasing agents to select vendors that 
deliver the best combination of desired non-price attributes at realistic funding levels.  The 
mechanism proposed in this paper is a multiattribute first price, sealed bid procurement 
auction.  It extends traditional price-only auctions to one in which competition takes place 
exclusively over attribute bundles.  The model is a multiattribute auction in which a set of 
possible budget levels is specified.  This model reveals the benefits of defining a 
procurement alternative in terms of its value to the buyer over a range of possible 
expenditures, rather than as a single point in budget-value space.  This new approach leads to 
some interesting results.  In particular, it suggests that in a fiscally constrained environment, 
the traditional approach of eliminating dominated alternatives could lead to sub-optimal 
decisions.  Finally, an extension of the model explicitly examines the buyer’s decision 
problem under budget uncertainty by applying a utility function assessed over the value 
measure. 




1.  Introduction 
Over the next five years, the US Department of Defense (DoD) plans to spend more than 
$357 billion on the development and procurement of major defense systems.  Recent 
congressional testimony urges the DoD to “achieve a balanced mix of weapon systems that 
are affordable” (Sullivan (GAO) 2009).  In the absence of profits to guide public 
procurement decisions, the challenge is to select vendors that deliver the best possible 
combination of desired non-price attributes at realistic funding levels.  The public 
procurement mechanism proposed in this paper is a multiattribute first price, sealed bid 
procurement auction. 
     The US Federal Acquisition Regulations (2005) provided guidance in subpart 14.5 on a 
two-step procurement process for government agencies: 
Step one consists of the request for, submission, evaluation, and (if necessary) 
discussion of a technical proposal.  No pricing is involved.  Step two involves the 
submission of sealed price bids by those who submitted acceptable technical 
proposals in step one.  Invitations for bids shall be issued only to those offerors 
submitting acceptable technical proposals in step one.  An objective is to permit the 
development of a sufficiently descriptive and not unduly restrictive statement of the 




Blondal (2006) discusses a similar two-stage1 bidding process, in which the procuring agency 
issues a general request, and then later issues a detailed request based on the responses 
received. 
     Much of the multiattribute auction literature, including Che (1993), Beil and Wein (2003), 
and Parkes and Kalagnanam (2005), either implicitly or explicitly includes price alongside 
non-price attributes in the buyer's value/utility function2.  While this standard approach is 
appropriate in many private-sector contexts, it generates complications in public 
procurements such as major defense acquisitions.  Unlike the private sector where the 
incentive to maximize profits provides a clear objective, the best government decision 
makers can do is to maximize value to the public given budget constraints. 
     Due to the existence of budget constraints, Michael and Becker (1973) make the argument 
that costs be excluded from measures of value.  Their focus is on performance and 
affordability.  This concept is known as “cost as an independent variable” (CAIV).  Vendors 
compete for a government contract based on their relative costs of producing different quality 
levels of components and their unique (sunk) technology investments that define their ability 
to offer different tradeoffs among these components.  Larsen (2007) offers the following 
explanation of CAIV: 
                                            
1Blondal defined "stage" differently than we do in this paper.  We use the term to refer to a decision or set of 
decisions that depends only on exogenously given parameters and previous decisions.  For example, Blondal 
considers a government agency's offer and the vendor responses to be a single stage, whereas we treat these as 
two distinct stages.  Using our interpretation, Blondal's model is in fact a five-stage process. 
2Value functions are often referred to in defense procurement as measures of effectiveness (MOEs).  The term 
“MOE” is used in a few different ways.  It may describe an attribute itself, a single-attribute value function, or a 
multiattribute value function, which might incorporate the whole objectives hierarchy, or only a portion of it.  
For a detailed discussion of MOEs, see Sproles (2000).  Regardless, this paper emphasizes using an MOE that 
includes exclusively non-price attributes. 
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All acquisition programs/issues consist of three fundamental elements: cost, 
performance and schedule.  Under CAIV, performance and schedule are considered a 
function of cost.  Cost and affordability should be a driving force not an output after 
potential solutions are established. (p. 15) 
Loerch, Koury, and Maxwell (1999) discuss a Value Added Analysis approach for applying 
multiattribute preferences to optimize the United States Army’s force structure under a 
budget constraint, in accordance with the CAIV concept.  The scope of our model differs 
from theirs, in that we focus on a single acquisition program.  This allows us to incorporate 
vendors' decision making into the model, along with issues of asymmetric information.  In 
our model, as in theirs, prices/costs do not appear in the buyer’s value function.  Instead, the 
buyer provides information about possible budget levels, allowing prices to appear in 
affordability constraints in the spirit of CAIV. 
     Budget constraints may not be known when the vendor selection decision is made.  Buede 
and Bresnick (1999) describe the acquisition process as having four major phases, and point 
out that vendor selection occurs in the first phase, while the budget may change throughout 
the entire process.  Two pioneers in defense economics, Hitch and McKean (1967), advocate 
determining the maximum effectiveness for a given budget, and then examining how each 
alternative fares under several different budget scenarios.  Quade (1989) also advocates 
evaluating vendor proposals based on a range of possible budgets.  This leads to the 
generation of what we call an “expansion path” for each vendor, showing how the vendor’s 
proposals change as the budget increases/decreases, and thus providing a more complete 
view of the vendor’s ability to provide performance.  Our model allows the buyer to offer a 
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set of possible budget levels and solicit vendor proposals for each one, leading to the 
generation of expansion paths. 
     Expansion paths are invaluable, because the buyer has otherwise very limited knowledge 
of the vendors' costs of producing a particular attribute, as well as the technologies 
(production functions) that combine those attributes into the products under consideration.  
Parkes and Kalagnanam (2005) describe the vendors' private information:  "Seller costs can 
be expected to depend on [the] local manufacturing base and sellers can be expected to be 
well informed about the cost of (upstream) raw materials" (p. 437).  The general motivation 
for constructing the expansion paths is expressed succinctly by Keeney (2004): “If you do 
not have the right problem, objectives, alternatives, list of uncertainties, and measures to 
indicate the degree to which the objectives are achieved, almost any analysis will be 
worthless” (p. 200).  It is imperative in public procurement for alternatives to be adequately 
described, and for any budget uncertainty to be explicitly acknowledged.  We emphasize that 
this can be carried out using a value-focused thinking approach, as discussed by Keeney 
(1992) and by Parnell (2007) in the context of national defense.  That is, it is important for 
the buyer's evaluation process to be carried out independently of the particular alternatives 
offered.  Two examples of this approach to public decision making with multiple objectives 
are presented by Merrick et al. (2005) and Mild and Salo (2009). 
     In Section 2, we introduce our proposed three-stage procurement model, emphasizing the 
use of a value function with exclusively non-price attributes, and the specification of a set of 
possible budget levels.  We formulate the decision problems faced by the buyer and the 
vendors, and discuss some of the insights which can be gained from the use of the model.   
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We also provide two historical examples of government procurement decisions that likely 
could have benefited from a more complete formulation of alternatives and uncertainties. 
     After vendor bids have been solicited for a spectrum of possible budget levels, Section 3 
expands the formulation of the buyer's problem to explicitly include the buyer’s beliefs about 
the probability associated with various budget levels.  We follow a decision under 
uncertainty approach as introduced by Pratt, Raiffa, and Schlaifer (1964).  In addition to 
expressing their beliefs about various budget levels as probabilities, the government buyer 
specifies a utility function over the value of attribute bundles that incorporates his/her risk 
attitude, as discussed by Dyer and Sarin (1982) and Matheson and Abbas (2005).  This 
results in a new metric proposed to evaluate vendors:  an expected utility measure of 
performance. 
 
2.  Model 
Our model consists of three stages, illustrated in Figure 1. 
*****INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE***** 
The procurement agency (buyer) begins by specifying a multiattribute value function over a 
set of desired attributes A = {a1, …, an}, as well as a set of (increasing) possible budget levels 
B = {b1, …, bk}.  There are m vendors, each of whom will respond in the second stage with a 
bid.  A bid consists of a set of attribute levels that can be produced by a vendor for each of 
the k possible budget levels.  Vendor j's bid can be expressed as k vectors of the form 
 1 , ,j j njA a a  for 1, ,j m , where ija  is the level of attribute i offered by vendor j.  
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Note that unlike bids in most multiattribute auctions, Aj does not include any information 
about price.  Instead, the price is implicitly captured by the possible budget constraints.  The 
buyer's ultimate decision (the third stage) is to select a vendor  1, ,j m .  The buyer’s 
preferences over the attributes are represented by a value function  jV A .  The same value 
function is used for all possible realized budget levels. 
     For ease of exposition, we assume  jV A  is an additive multiattribute value function 
similar to that discussed by Keeney and Raiffa (1976) and Kirkwood (1997), although it is 
later demonstrated the conclusions of the paper do not require  jV A  to be additive.  The 
use of additive multiattribute value functions requires the assumption of mutual preferential 
independence (Dyer and Sarin 1979, Kirkwood and Sarin 1980).  This implies that 
alternatives can be compared based exclusively on the set of attributes over which they 
differ, ignoring common levels of other attributes.  
     For any given budget level, the buyer's objective is: 
max
j  
   
1
n
j i i ij
i
V A w v a

  ,  (1) 
where 
iw  is the weight the buyer places on attribute i: 0≤ iw ≤1, and iw =1, and  i ijv a  is 
the buyer’s single-attribute value function for attribute i.  We assume that vi(aij) is scaled 
such that the minimum achievable value is zero, and the maximum achievable value is one.  
Note that since  jV A  is a weighted average of terms between zero and one, it also ranges 
from zero to one.  We assume the buyer has an understanding of the range of attribute levels 
in determining the weights, and that the buyer explicitly shares the weights and the single-
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attribute value functions.  It is necessary for the buyer to completely specify preferences to 
the vendors by providing wi and vi(aij), for i = 1, …, n.  The final stage of the model involves 
applying (1) to the set of vendor bids, and the buyer selecting the vendor that yields the 
highest value. 
     Given the buyer-determined set of desired attributes A, along with the weights and single-
attribute value functions, and the set of possible budget levels B, each vendor produces an 
attribute bundle to submit to the buyer for each of the k possible budget constraints.  Since 
vendors have private information about their own production capabilities and costs, each 
vendor forms his/her own private beliefs about the likelihood of a bid being accepted.  We 
assume that all vendors believe the probability of a bid being accepted is increasing in 
 jV A  for all possible budget levels. 
     For simplicity, we also assume that each vendor has determined a desired amount of profit 
for each possible budget level, and that these fixed profit margins are incorporated into the 
attribute bundles offered.  That is, we focus on the vendor’s decision of how to allocate fixed 
amounts of money across the set of attributes to maximize the value provided to the buyer.  
Incorporating more detailed vendor behavior is not needed to obtain the main results in this 
paper, but would certainly be an interesting extension to the model.  It is analogous to the 
problem of determining a bidding strategy for a Dutch auction (see McAfee and McMillan 
1987 or Milgrom 1989), which requires a complete formulation of the bidder’s beliefs, 
values, and risk attitude. 
     The problem faced by a representative vendor j for an arbitrary possible budget level b 
can be expressed as follows: 
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                                                max
ija
    
1
n
j ij i ij
i
V A w v a

  , 1, ,i n  
                                            subject to:      1 , ,j i j n njC v a v a b ,                                     (2) 
where Cj is the total cost paid by firm j (with the desired profit margin included) to produce a 
set of single-attribute values.  The cost incurred to generate the corresponding attribute 
bundle cannot exceed b.  We assume that Cj is increasing in iv  for all i, and that Cj is strictly 
convex.  This condition is not overly restrictive, since it simply implies decreasing returns 
from vendor investments to improve the individual attribute values.  Because the objective 
function in (2) is linear, given the assumed properties of a representative vendor’s cost 
function, a unique solution (vendor proposal) will exist. 
     For purposes of illustration, and ease of exposition, the remainder of this study focuses on 
two vendors and two (non-price) attributes.  The two vendors can have different technologies 
with which to combine the two attributes, and may face different costs to improve individual 
attributes.  The Lagrangian function to solve the vendor’s problem is given by 
         1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2,j j j j j j jL w v a w v a b C v a v a    , for j = 1,2.  (3) 
Since an improvement in either attribute increases the value of a particular attribute bundle to 
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This implies the optimum strategy for each vendor is to choose a bid that uses the entire 
budget, and for which the two attributes have equal ratios between the weight placed on the 
attribute by the buyer and the vendor’s marginal cost of increasing the value provided by that 
attribute3.  With two competing vendors, there will be two bids that can be represented by 
attribute bundles:  11 21,a a  and  12 22,a a .   
     Of course, cost functions are likely to vary across vendors, meaning that the marginal 
costs in (5) are likely to vary across vendors as well, resulting in a potentially diverse set of 
bids.  Multiattribute auctions allow vendors to differentiate themselves in the auction process 
and to bid on their competitive advantages (Wise and Morrison 2000). 
     With the buyer’s preferences and the vendor’s bidding strategy in place, we now 
demonstrate how a buyer can explore important differences between vendors.  Each vendor 
goes through the process described above for the k different budget estimates, each time 
producing a bid that satisfies (5) for each of the k possible budgets.  This set of bids from a 
                                            
3
Note that Equation 5 has a unique solution for each vendor when the entire budget is being used.  Because the 
cost function is strictly convex, as we move along the budget constraint curve, the marginal cost of improving 
one attribute’s value is increasing, and the marginal cost of improving the other attribute’s value is decreasing. 
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vendor constitutes an expansion path.  It tells the buyer precisely how a vendor’s bid will 
change as the budget constraint is relaxed (or tightened). For purposes of illustration, 
throughout the remainder of the paper, we will use a set of six possible budget levels to 
simulate alternative possible funding constraints: ($5M, $10M, $15M, $20M, $25M, $30M) 
or simply (5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30). 
     Consider the following functional form for the cost functions: 
        1 1 1 2 2 21 1 2 2 1 2, j j j j
v a v a
j j j j jC v a v a e e
 
   , 
1 2 1 2, , , 0j j j j      for 1,2j  .   (6) 
This particular functional form is separable, in that it consists of the sum of cost functions on 
the individual attributes.  Each individual attribute cost function is increasing and convex, 
where the exponent 
ij  in (6) determines the convexity of each function.  Although the 
results of the study do not depend on this particular functional form, this offers a relatively 
simple way to illustrate our expansion path approach to governments' vendor selection 
decisions. 
     Figure 2 offers an example of an expansion path.  The buyer in this example places a 
weight of 0.7 on attribute 1, and 0.3 on attribute 2.  The vendor represented in Figure 2, 
whom we will refer to as vendor 1, faces lower marginal costs to improve attribute 1 than to 
improve attribute 2 at low levels.  Specifically, 
                                         11 21 11 21
2.2, 2.7, 2.0, 1.7       .                                         (7) 
*****INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE***** 
     Expansion paths will differ among vendors if the parameters of their cost functions 
( ,ij ij  ) differ.  Consider a second vendor (vendor 2) whose individual-attribute cost 
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functions are more convex.  Specifically, 
                                      
12 22 12 221.5, 1.5, 2.7, 2.7       .                                   (8) 
Vendor 2 is symmetric in the sense that (s)he does not specialize in developing a particular 
attribute.  Any asymmetry in vendor 2's expansion path is due to the buyer having 
asymmetric preferences over the two attributes. 
     Applying the parameters in (7) and (8) results in the expansion paths shown in Figure 3.  
The two piecewise linear expansion paths, one for each vendor, are based on the six possible 
budget levels4.  They illustrate optimum combinations of attribute values that can be 
produced by each vendor, and offered to the buyer at the different budget levels. 
*****INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE***** 
     Figure 3 reveals an interesting dynamic, which relates to one of the key insights of this 
study.  Under optimistic assumptions about future budgets, it is clear that vendor 1 will be 
preferred and selected as the winner. At relatively high budgets, vendor 1 dominates vendor 
2.  However, the reverse is true under a more pessimistic budget.    Under severe budget 
constraints (e.g. $5 million), it is clear vendor 2 will be preferred and selected as the winner.  
If a government buyer believes a significant budget cut is possible, then selecting a dominant 
alternative under the optimistic budget scenario (vendor 1) may be misleading. The 
dominated alternative (vendor 2) should not be prematurely eliminated since it may in fact 
end up being the preferred vendor. 
                                            
4 Fitting a curve to the points might also be a reasonable approach.  We use a piecewise linear form because we 
specifically would like every attribute bundle in the vendor's bid to fall on the expansion path, as we believe this 
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     To illustrate this new expansion path approach more clearly, we compute  jV A  for each 
of the twelve attribute pairs shown in Figure 3.  The two vendors' bids can then be plotted as 
curves in “budget-value” (or cost-effectiveness) space: 
*****INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE***** 
Related to the expansion paths, the bids illustrated in Figure 4 are piecewise linear curves.  
We can think of each one as a function expressing the value to the buyer of the attribute 
bundles each vendor will provide over the range of possible budget levels.  We will write this 
function for vendor j as Ωj(b), defined for all possible budget levels b.   
     The dynamic revealed in Figure 3 is illustrated more clearly in Figure 4.  It is apparent 
from Figure 4 that vendor 2 dominates the competition for any positive budget below the 
switch-point, b < b’, while vendor 1 dominates for any budget above the switch-point, b > b’.  
As Quade (1989) also argues, this observation suggests rethinking the simpler definition of 
dominance, which refers to points (not functions) in cost-effectiveness space.  Viewing 
alternatives as functions in budget-value space reveals that the point-based definition can be 
misleading.  A static comparison that begins by assuming a relatively high fixed budget 
would eliminate vendor 2 from further consideration.  For example, consider offers from 
vendor 1 and vendor 2 based on very optimistic budgets above b’.  A technique that focuses 
on points and not functions would eliminate vendor 2.  Yet, Figure 4 indicates that 
eliminating vendor 2 prematurely could lead to a less desirable outcome if subsequent budget 
                                                                                                                                       
makes the method more transparent.  We would advise the analyst and the buyer to use their discretion on 
which approach to take, based on the particular context of the auction. 
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cuts resulted in an actual budget somewhere in the range of 0 < b < b’.  This observation 
suggests the need for a new approach to government’s vendor selection decisions. 
     This switch-point phenomenon occurs as a result of differences in the two vendors’ 
expansion paths.  There is nothing unique about the particular functions chosen in our 
example.  The same results can be obtained in many different ways, including with non-
additive forms of the buyer’s value function.  In fact, non-linear interactions between 
attributes are likely to magnify this effect5. 
     While the approach in this paper involves assessing the expansion paths by soliciting 
vendors’ attribute bundle offers for multiple budgets, it may be possible for a government 
buyer to obtain similar information by soliciting price bids for multiple sets of performance 
requirements (i.e. specified attribute levels).  This would have the advantage of not requiring 
the buyer to reveal a value function, but also the corresponding disadvantage of not allowing 
each vendor the flexibility to achieve the desired values with the least costly combinations of 
attribute levels.  Using either approach, the buyer benefits by being able to incorporate 
affordability into the decision in a meaningful way when the budget is not known with 
certainty.  In particular, the buyer gains the ability to view each alternative as a function in 
cost-effectiveness space, rather than as a single point.   
     Selecting a vendor based on points in cost-effectiveness space can lead to worse outcomes 
than expected, since there may be uncertainties present which are implicitly being ignored.  
One such example is the $8.8 billion US Navy and Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) contract, 
16 
 
which was awarded to Electronic Data System (EDS) in 2000.  Wilson (2006) explains that 
EDS was the lowest bidder, and that problems arose due to the scope of EDS’ task being 
much larger than expected by either party.  Whether another vendor might have performed 
better than EDS given the expanded scope is unknown.  (See Jordan (2007) for more 
information on NMCI.) 
     A second example is the US Air Force’s acquisition of the Boeing (then McDonnell 
Douglas) C-17 Globemaster III.  This aircraft, usually referred to simply as the C-17, is used 
as an airlifter for troops and cargo.  The C-17 proposal was selected in 1981, effectively 
ending the bidding process.  However, a dollar amount was not specified until 1986, when 
the Air Force awarded McDonnell Douglas a $3.39 billion contract.  Even after 1986, the C-
17 program was subjected to a great deal of change.  Kennedy (1999) explains: 
In addition, how much airlift was required for war plans was largely undefined. 
Securing necessary funding for the C-17 was simply an ordeal. That the program’s 
funding fell victim to the budget axes wielded by Congress, DoD, and Air Force 
undermined the ultimate goal — timely operational delivery of the C-17. 
As in the NMCI example, it would have been very difficult to foresee the eventual outcome 
for the C-17 based simply on a cost-effectiveness point when the decision was made. 
     The sensitivity of vendor selection decisions to the budget is a fundamental result that 
arises in a wide variety of government procurement contexts, and places a premium on 
                                                                                                                                       
5
For example, consider a multiplicative value function, and suppose that one vendor has to incur a large cost to 
increase the value from 0 to 0.1 for one particular attribute.  This vendor will offer bids of little value for low 
budgets, but, depending on cost functions, may offer very attractive bids for higher budgets. 
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affordability.  In a constrained fiscal environment, we strongly recommend the adoption of 
an expansion path perspective to guide governments’ vendor selection decisions. 
 
3.  Budget Uncertainty 
A natural extension of the model is to consider a procurement auction in which the buyer 
assigns a probability distribution over the set of possible budgets.  If the buyer believes the 
realized budget will be b with probability p(b), or, in the continuous case, that b has a 
probability density function f(b), then the government's vendor-selection problem can be 
examined using a decision under uncertainty approach. 
     This adds another interesting layer to the problem: We must now include the buyer’s risk 
attitude, because (s)he will be evaluating gambles over multiple possible values.  We express 
risk attitudes through a utility function U, which takes the overall multiattribute value 
measure as its argument (see Dyer and Sarin 1982 or Matheson and Abbas 2005 for details).  
This approach allows us to separate attitude toward risk and strength of preferences over the 
attributes. 
     Given a value function V and maximum and minimum achievable values, U can be 
assessed using simple binary gambles.  For example, the buyer could specify an attribute 
bundle a
0
 providing the minimum value (zero) and an attribute bundle a* providing the 
maximum value (one), and then consider a hypothetical gamble in which (s)he receives a* 
with probability p, and a
0
 with probability 1-p.  For any other attribute bundle a’, U(V(a’)) 
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would simply be the value of p for which the buyer is indifferent between receiving the 
gamble and receiving a’ for sure. 
     The government buyer’s problem is to select a vendor j to maximize 
    j
b
p b U b ,  (9) 
or in the continuous case, to maximize 
    jf b U b db .  (10) 
That is, the government buyer wishes to maximize the expected utility provided by the 
vendor, incorporating both the strength of preferences over the attribute bundle offered 
(expressed by Ωj), and the buyer's risk attitude (expressed by U). 
     Consider both the buyer and vendors’ information used to generate Figure 3.  Recall that 
the buyer places weights of 0.7 and 0.3 on attributes 1 and 2 respectively, while vendor 

















,  (11) 
                                            
6
 We chose the exponential function because it has constant absolute risk aversion, measured by a risk tolerance 
parameter (in this case, 0.5), making its assessment reasonably straightforward and understandable.  It is 
commonly used in decisions under uncertainty, but the analysis could certainly be carried out using a different 
class of utility function if desired. 
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where V varies between zero and one over the possible attribute bundles, as described 
previously.  The function and parameters given by (11) represent a decision-maker who is 
risk averse.  Note that since the minimum value of V is zero and the maximum is one, U(V) 
also varies between zero and one.  Figure 5 illustrates the values and corresponding utilities 
to the buyer of each vendor's attribute bundle proposals under the six possible budget 
scenarios, overlaying them on the utility function defined by (11): 
*****INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE***** 
     Consider an example scenario in which the buyer believes that b1, …, b6 will occur with 
probabilities 0.1, 0.15, 0.35, 0.25, 0.1, and 0.05, respectively.  Given these probabilities for 
the six budget levels and this particular buyer's preferences, the expected utility if vendor 1 is 
selected is 0.771, as opposed to 0.800 if vendor 2 is selected.  While this aggregate result 
suggests our buyer should select vendor 2, disaggregating the vendor selection problem 
offers additional insights. 
     The bundle of attributes provided by vendor 1 would be more desirable for budgets of 15, 
20, 25, and 30, one of which will occur with a probability of 0.75.  However, vendor 1’s 
attribute bundle would be far less desirable in the case of a very low budget.  Moreover, the 
expected values of the two bids are nearly identical.  Such a conclusion would be nearly 
impossible to foresee when presented only with a single bid from each vendor for the most 
likely budget, b = 15. 
     If a vendor’s bid consists of only one attribute bundle rather than a set of attribute 
bundles, then constructing a gamble over possible overall values is extremely difficult.  A 
decision under uncertainty approach requires that the decision maker place a value on all 
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possible outcomes.  The procurement auction framework advocated in this paper ensures that 
these outcomes can be fully specified. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
This paper offers a new approach to government’s vendor selection decisions in major public 
procurements. The paper describes a simple three-stage, multiattribute procurement process 
for public vendor selection decisions.  It operationalizes a version of the popular concept of 
cost as an independent variable (CAIV). 
     The model developed in this paper allows vendors to submit bids for a range of possible 
budget levels.  This leads to the generation of an expansion path for each vendor, which 
illustrates how the vendor’s bid improves as budgets increase.  Most importantly, it is 
demonstrated that a vendor whose bid is dominated at one particular budget level can easily 
end up being the winner at another budget level.  This makes it vital for procurement 
agencies to rethink traditional public sector bid solicitations.  Instead of viewing each vendor 
as a single point in cost-effectiveness space, it is important to view each vendor as a curve in 
budget-value space.  In economies where affordability is a priority and where budgets are 
likely to change over time, this approach can result in better choices for voters and taxpayers, 
since it ensures vendors are not prematurely eliminated from consideration. 
     Finally, given the acknowledgment that the budget level may not be known when the 
decision is made, we explicitly model vendor selection as a decision under uncertainty.  The 
buyer assigns a probability distribution over all possible budget levels, while a utility 
21 
 
function captures the buyer’s attitude towards risk.  This methodology enables buyers to 
generate expected utilities from vendor proposals. 
     The approach in this paper can be thought of as a strategic choice of auction mechanism 
for a buyer when a range of budget authorities for the program can be estimated/forecasted, 
and products are differentiated and complex.  It combines the competitive advantages of 
auctions with the flexibility of decisions based on multiple attributes of a product, while 
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Figure 2.  This graph shows the expansion path for a vendor as the budget increases from 5 to 30.  The markers 






















Figure 3.  This graph shows the expansion paths for two vendors with differing cost functions as the budget 
increases from 5 to 30.  The markers of increasing size show each vendor’s attribute bundle proposals as the 



































Figure 5.  The buyer's utility function and the value and corresponding utility offered by each vendor  for the six 
budget scenarios in the decision under uncertainty example. 
